

Jessica J. R. Wright

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Education

- 2020** **Ph.D.** in philosophy (May 2020), University of Toronto
Thesis Title: *Owning Implicit Attitudes*
Thesis Committee co-chairs: Cheryl Misak, Jennifer Nagel
Readers: Andrew Sepielli, David Barnett
- 2014** **M.A.** in philosophy, University of Toronto.
- 2012** **B.A.** honours, specialization in philosophy, minor in classical studies, University of Ottawa.

Areas of Specialization and Competence

AOS: Ethics, Philosophy of Mind (esp. philosophy of psychology).

AOC: Bioethics, Epistemology, Pragmatism, Environmental Ethics.

Academic Appointments

Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Toronto

May-December 2020

Publications

- “Free Will & Implicit Attitudes” with Neil Levy, in *The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Free Will*, edited by Kristin Mickelson, Joseph Campbell & Alan White (Wiley-Blackwell). *Forthcoming*
- “The Psychology of Epistemic Judgement” with Jennifer Nagel, in *The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology* (second edition), edited by Sarah Robins, John Symons & Paco Calvo (Routledge). 2019
- “Ramsey’s Theory of Belief and the Problem of Attitude Divergence” in *Pragmatism and Objectivity: Essays Sparked by the Work of Nicholas Rescher*, edited by Sami Pihlström (Routledge). 2017

Other Papers

- “Are Implicit Attitudes Arational?” *Revise & Resubmit*
- “Controlling Implicit Attitudes” *In Progress*
- “The Empirical Approach to the Metaphysics of Mental States” *In Progress*
- “Self-Knowledge and Implicit Attitudes” *In Progress*

Prizes and Awards

- Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) Joseph-Armand Bombardier Canada Graduate Scholarship-Doctoral (Canadian national doctoral fellowship). Sept. 2016-Aug. 2019
- APA Graduate Student Stipend for “Cognitive Control and Implicit Attitudes”. March 2018
- Balzan Foundation Travel Fellowship for travel to Oslo, Norway to attend “Statistics for Philosophers”. September 2017
- APA Graduate Student Stipend for “Disassociating Implicit Attitudes”. January 2017
- First Prize in the Canadian Philosophical Association Student Essay Competition for “Disassociating Implicit Attitudes”. May 2016

- University of Toronto School of Graduate Studies conference grant for travel to Paris, France to present “Making Sense of Peirce’s Sentimentalism”. September 2015
- Ontario Graduate Studies (OGS) (Ontario provincial graduate fellowship). September 2015
- Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) CGSM Master’s Scholarship (Canadian national master’s fellowship). September 2013
- University of Ottawa undergraduate entrance scholarship. September 2006

Presentations

- “Are Implicit Attitudes Arational?”, Canadian Philosophical Association (CPA) in London, Ontario (refereed) *Cancelled due to Covid-19*
- “Are Implicit Attitudes Arational?”, Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology (SSPP) in Louisville, Kentucky (refereed). *Cancelled due to Covid-19*
- “Are Implicit Attitudes Arational?”, Chapel Hill Normativity Workshop in Chapel Hill, North Carolina (refereed). March 2020
- “Cognitive Control and Rational Evaluation”, Canadian Philosophical Association (CPA) in Montréal, Quebec (refereed). June 04, 2018
- “Cognitive Control and Implicit Attitudes”, American Philosophical Association (APA) Pacific Division in San Diego, California (refereed). March 27, 2018
- “Cognitive Control and Rational Evaluation”, Canadian Society for Epistemology (CSE) in Montréal, Quebec (refereed). November 17, 2017
- “Disassociating Implicit Attitudes”, American Philosophical Association (APA) Eastern Division in Baltimore, Maryland (refereed). January 4, 2017
- “Disassociating Implicit Attitudes”, Canadian Philosophical Association (CPA) Annual Congress at the University of Calgary in Calgary, Alberta (refereed). May 29, 2016
First prize winner in CPA student essay competition.
- “Disassociating Implicit Attitudes”, The Irrationality Conference, King’s College London (KCL) in London, England (refereed). February 19, 2016
- “Making Sense of Peirce’s Sentimentalism”, Second Annual European Pragmatism Conference at École Normale Supérieure in Paris, France (refereed). September 10, 2015
- “Responsibility for Implicit Bias”, Women in Philosophy Conference at the University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario (invited). October 29, 2014

Comments

- Comments on Chris Howard, title TBD, St. Louis Annual Conference in Reasons and Rationality (SLACRR). *Delayed due to Covid-19*
- Comments on Nathan Howard, “Factualists can’t Solve the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem”, American Philosophical Association (APA) Pacific Division in Vancouver, British Columbia. April 19, 2019
- Comments on Brett Karlan, “Bias and Belief”, Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology (SSPP) in Cincinnati, Ohio. March 07, 2019
- Comments on Joëlle Proust (keynote), “A Prospective View”, University of Toronto Graduate Conference in Toronto, Ontario. May 07, 2018
- Comments on Amy Flowerree, “Evidentialism in Action”, Chapel Hill Normativity Workshop in Chapel Hill, North Carolina. March 08, 2018
- Comments on Abraham Graber, “Reconciling Strong Motive Internalism, Humean Psychology, and the Traditional Realism of Moore and Shafer- April 14, 2017

Landau”, American Philosophical Association (APA) Pacific Division in Seattle, Washington.

Refereed Workshops

- “Athena in Action” women in philosophy workshop (invited on strength of paper submission), Princeton University. August 16-19, 2016

Consulting

- Consultant in the “Oxford Beliefs Workshop,” held for the John Templeton Foundation. Workshop on beliefs and sub-doxastic states (June-August 2020).

Teaching Experience

Course Instructor positions at University of Toronto:

- Bioethics (PHL283) at University of Toronto, Mississauga (online, hybrid) Fall 2020
- Philosophy of Mind (PHL240) at University of Toronto, St. George (online, asynchronous) Summer 2020
- Belief, Truth & Knowledge (PHLB20) at University of Toronto, Scarborough (online, asynchronous) Summer 2020
- Bioethics (PHL281) at University of Toronto, St. George Summer 2018

Lead Writing Teaching Assistant (LWTA) for the Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto, St. George campus. May 2019-April 2020

Tutorial Leader positions at University of Toronto:

- Minds & Machines (PHL342) for James John Fall 2020
- Introduction to Philosophy (Knowledge & Reality) (PHL103) for Alex Koo Winter 2020
- Persons, Minds, and Bodies (PHL240) for David Barnett Fall 2019
- Introduction to Philosophy: Persons and Values (PHL113) for Sergio Tenenbaum (Head TA) Fall 2018
- Ethics and Moral Philosophy (PHL275) for Tom Hurka Fall 2016
- Bioethics (PHL281) for Donald Ainslie Winter 2016
- Ethics and Moral Philosophy (PHL275) for Sergio Tenenbaum Fall 2015
- Bioethics (PHL281) for Agnes Bolinska Summer 2015

Grader positions at University of Toronto:

- Issues in Ethics (PHL375) for Catharine Diehl Summer 2019
- Ethics & Mental Health (PHL383) for Thomas Matthien Winter 2019
- Philosophy in Everyday Life (PHL204) for Owen Pikkert Winter 2019
- Environmental Ethics (PHL273) for Ashley Taylor Winter 2015
- Environmental Ethics (PHL273) for Kyle Menken Summer 2014
- Human Nature (PHL244) for Charles Repp Winter 2014
- Issues in Epistemology (PHL333) for Nate Charlow Fall 2013

Teaching Training

- Training for philosophy Lead Writing TA (30+ hours) with Prof. Andrea Williams and Prof. Erin Vearncombe, University of Toronto. June 2019-January 2020
- Teaching Fundamentals Certificate from the Teaching Assistants’ Training Program (TATP), University of Toronto Centre for Teaching Support and Innovation. May 2016

- “Teaching Philosophy”, course with various instructors from the University of Toronto, Department of Philosophy.

Fall 2013

Research Experience

Research Assistant for *Cambridge Pragmatism* by Cheryl Misak
(Duties included archival research, commenting and editing).

Sept. 2013-Dec. 2015

Graduate Courses Completed

Fall 2017

(University of Oslo)

- Statistics for Philosophers (Instructed by Dr. Pål Ulleberg, Professor of Psychology and Dr. Dag-Erik Eilertsen, Professor of Psychology).

Winter 2015

(University of Toronto)

- Philosophy of Mind: Beliefs and Attitudes (Jennifer Nagel)
- Metaethics: What do We Want from Objectivity? (Andrew Sepielli)
- Wittgenstein: *Investigations* and *On Certainty* (Sonia Sedivy)

Fall 2014

(University of Toronto)

- Metaethics: Value Theory (Philip Clark)
- Epistemology: Subjectivity and Objectivity (Jonathan Weisberg)
- Philosophy of Biology (Denis Walsh)

Winter 2014

(University of Toronto)

- Pragmatism: C.S. Peirce, C.I. Lewis, and F.P. Ramsey (Cheryl Misak)
- Philosophy of Mind: Siegel, Recanati, Soteriou (Imogen Dickie)
- Ethics: Sidgwick, Moore and Ross (Tom Hurka)

Fall 2013

(University of Toronto)

- Ancient Epistemology: Plato, Aristotle, Sceptics, Stoics (Lloyd Gerson)
- Kant: The First Critique (Margaret Morrison)
- Hermeneutics: Gadamer to Searle (Lambert Zuidervaart)

Departmental Service

- University of Toronto Grad Forum coordinator 2018-2019
- Article on Mind & Epistemology in Toronto *Philosophy News* Winter 2018
- University of Toronto Department of Philosophy Women’s Caucus coordinator 2016-2017
- Refereeing for University of Toronto Department of Philosophy Graduate Conference (yearly) 2014-2019

Dissertation Abstract

Implicit attitudes are best understood as attitudes accessed by indirect tests. Most philosophers working on implicit cognition hold that agents are not responsible for their implicit attitudes, because implicit attitudes are not the right kind of thing to reflect on the agent herself. In my dissertation I argue against this claim. I make two kinds of arguments. The first are philosophical arguments about the nature of moral responsibility and what it takes for a mental state to reflect on a person in a minimal sense. The ‘minimal sense’ that I am interested in is what it takes for a mental state to be ‘truly ours’, or to reflect on the person. The second kind of argument I make throughout my dissertation is empirical. Engaging with the literature on implicit attitudes, I show that the claim that we are not responsible for our implicit attitudes often fails, because claims that implicit attitudes are unconscious, uncontrolled or associative fail to be empirically proven. This, I argue, leaves us with the view that (most) implicit attitudes are ones that we are (directly) morally responsible for, in the minimal sense that they are truly ‘our’ attitudes, and reflect on us as persons.

References

Cheryl Misak, FRSC (co-supervisor)

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Jennifer Nagel (co-supervisor)

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Philip Clark (teaching reference)

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Neil Levy, FAHA

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